Various seventeenth-century parliamentarians resorted to the concept of acquisitive prescription when denouncing irresponsible use of the royal prerogative. Often, the concept was invoked to convey nothing more than that a custom had existed since time immemorial. Yet sometimes the concept was used in its legal sense -to denote the acquisition of a right (as if someone with the authority to grant that right had done so) by virtue of some instance of long and uninterrupted enjoyment over a period of time. This article considers the application of acquisitive prescription, a doctrine rooted in the medieval law of land obligations, in Stuart constitutional discourse.
freedom from arbitrary entry, search, and seizure. These rights are deemed fundamental not in the sense that they are unassailable but rather in the sense that it would be a remarkably unwise parliament that did not consider it imperative that they never be restricted or removed without good cause.
1 Parliament is entitled to repeal statutes and abrogate precedents which make these rights part of the law of the land, but politicians and political parties might suffer at the ballot box if they try to persuade parliament to do so. 2 And although the judiciary cannot invalidate enacted laws, there is judicial dicta stretching back centuries to the effect that if parliament legislated unreasonably to remove or restrict rights of this kind, a court might take it upon itself to refuse to apply the relevant statutes or statutory provisions. 3 Whether or not courts ever would presume to exercise this nuclear option, judges certainly can and do rely on interpretive principles and presumptions which require parliament to use unambiguous statutory language if a right is to be disturbed. 4 The legislature has supreme law-making 1 So it is that one sometimes finds British jurists and constitutional theorists depicting an unwise law as legal but unconstitutional. . . may seek to use it[s majority] to abolish judicial review or to diminish the role of the courts in protecting the interests of the individual. Whether this is likely to happen is not the point. It is enough that it might conceivably do so. The rule of law requires that the judges must retain the power to insist that legislation of that extreme kind is not law which the courts will recognise.' 4 See e.g. Secretary of State, ex p Simms, supra note 2 at 131 (Lord Hoffmann): 'Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. . . . In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts . . .
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(Fall 2016) 66 UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS authority, in short, but abuse of this authority -scant regard for basic rights -could be politically costly and might encounter considerable resistance. This article is concerned with one particular argument for speaking of rights as fundamental in the absence of a written constitution. The argument, expressed skeletally, is that a supreme lawmaker -the argument was devised as a response to royal absolutism -should presume against disturbing unwritten constitutional arrangements, conventions, privileges, and liberties that people have enjoyed continuously throughout a prescription period. Although the argument has not gone unnoticed by historians, it appears to have engaged constitutional lawyers barely at all. 5 This could be because they find the argument unconvincing and insignificant, though it is more likely that they have simply not noted its difference from another, better known argument concerning the antiquity of the common law constitution.
The argument from prescription is, in fact, distinctive and intriguing. To categorize a right as fundamental because of prescription is not to presume that the right is set down in a text or that it would be selfevidently contrary to reason to treat the right as anything other than fundamental; the argument is not even that a fundamental right is an expression of tried reason that has stood the test of time. Rather, it is that some rights are fundamental because the people (or their political representatives) have availed themselves of those rights since a time legally identified as that before which the lawful origin of a right cannot be proved, so that lawful origin has to be inferred. Those who advanced this argument -mainly Whig historians in the second half of the seventeenth century -had hardly anything to say about why the existence of a right since a specific date should make that right fundamental. Nor were those making the argument always attentive to the distinction between prescription and custom: sometimes, their point was not that a right is to be treated as fundamental because it has existed throughout a prescription period but rather that the persistence of a custom throughout the presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document'; also R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2), [2008] UKHL 61 at para 45 (Lord Hoffmann). 5 There are occasional cameo appearances. E.g. Joseph Jaconelli, 'Do Constitutional Conventions Bind? ' (2005) 64 Camb LJ 149 at 162: 'The idea that constitutional conventions could acquire force of law through a process similar to prescription has, at present, no basis in legal authority. ' period makes that custom part of the common law. (This conflation of prescription and custom probably explains why the argument from prescription tends not to be distinguished from claims regarding the antiquity of the common law constitution.) It is interesting, nevertheless, to reflect -speculative though the reflections sometimes turn out to beon those instances in which seventeenth-century constitutional writers appealed to prescription as a concept in its own right, and on why they should have considered it significant that particular rights had (as they saw it) been prescriptively acquired.
In the next Part, I outline the common law of prescription, not only so that readers not familiar with it might understand it but also so that readers might come to recognize that certain Stuart constitutional writers turned a refined doctrine of land obligations into a far less refined argument concerning fundamental rights. In Part III, I consider the various ways in which prescription was invoked in seventeenth-century constitutional discourse before concluding, in Part IV, with some reflections on what was an unconvincing, but not altogether unenlightening, attempt at conceptual transplant. II 
Prescription
Most legal systems have rules or conventions whereby, after a period of time, somebody either is stripped of something they had or obtains something they did not have. The case of stripping is called extinctive prescription (or limitation): a right, or more accurately a right of action, prescribes (ceases to exist) because a specific period of time has passed during which someone holding that right of action failed to exercise it. 6 The case of obtaining is called acquisitive prescription: a right prescribes (comes into being) because a specific period of time has passed during which somebody who did not hold that right acted -and was never challenged for acting -as if they did hold it. This article is primarily concerned with prescription as a mode of acquisition.
Acquisitive prescription appears to have been invented to remedy the deficiencies of another concept. According to the Roman law doctrine of usucapio, a transferee who in good faith purchased, inherited, or accepted as a gift property which the transferor did not own, would acquire dominium over that property by virtue of having been in continuous possession of it for a period of time (two years for land, one year for moveables). 7 The most significant limitation of usucapio was that it did not apply to the possession of provincial lands. In the late second century AD, the praetors supplemented usucapio by introducing a defence of longi temporis praescriptio, whereby a person with an original entitlement to land, provincial land included, was barred from asserting his rights to that land if the defendant had held it without interruption for ten years (if the parties lived in the same district) or twenty years (if they did not). 8 The defence was originally thought of as extinctive: the defendant who successfully entered this plea saw a claimant's right brought to an end owing to the claimant having failed to exercise his right within the relevant period. By the fourth century AD, however, the standard explanation of longi temporis praescriptio seems to be not that the claimant lost but rather that the defendant acquired a right owing to his continuous possession having gone unchallenged.
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A COMMON LAW ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION This conception of prescription, whereby a right in land is acquired by virtue of uninterrupted use or enjoyment over a long period of time, made its way into English law during the high Middle Ages. As in Roman law, the rules on acquisition have a connection to rules governing extinction. The relationship between the two sets of rules is not easily summarized. Medieval real actions for the recovery of possession of land (seisin) were subject to limitation by past events. In the late twelfth century, a claimant seeking to recover had to trace a right of seisin from his ancestors who had held that right since -but not before -the accession of Henry I (5 August 1100). Around 1200, the reference point for establishing rightful seisin was changed to 1 December 1135 (the day of Henry I's death). These rules regarding recovery of seisin were extinctive rather than acquisitive. A claimant's inability to bring an action within the relevant limitation period either barred his remedy or raised the presumption that he (or an ancestor) had transferred lawful title to the land to the person (or an ancestor of the person) from whom he had hoped to recover. Bracton, who was most likely writing in the 1220s and 1230s, observed that an accession date, besides limiting the period of recovery, also fixed the point of legal memory: a claimant had to 'specify a certain time and a certain king of whose time he talks' if he was to recover, 12 and if he could not make his case within the relevant time period he lost his right 'for lack of proof.' 13 Limiting an action for recovery to time since a coronation date militated against claimants bringing actions which depended on accounts of accounts: he who vouched for the claimant would be testifying that he saw for himself that the claimant's ancestor had rightful seisin, not that he had known someone (no longer alive) who had said that the claimant's ancestor had rightful seisin. Proof meant proof within living memory, and a coronation date established what exceeded living memory.
10 Richard was in France on 6 July 1189 when his father (Henry II) died. Although Richard was entitled to the throne from that date, he did not accede to it until 3 September, the day of his coronation. The consequence for a claimant who could not bring evidence of rightful seisin since the relevant coronation date was clear enough. The more interesting questions came from the other direction. If someone possessed or enjoyed a plot of land during the prescription period without having been granted a right to do so -perhaps expecting to have to contend with an action for recovery of seisin but that action never having materialized or having foundered -what, if anything, would he acquire? If he acquired anything, did acquisition depend on his having enjoyed whatever was acquired since a date fixed in a limitation statute?
Consider, first, the question regarding the date. Bracton had accepted that easements and other incorporeal rights -to use a neighbour's pathway, to fish in his stream, to mine his land, to take from his trees, and the like -could be acquired 'by long use, with peaceful possession, continuous and uninterrupted, . . . provided that there has been no force, no stealth, and no permission (nec vi nec clam nec precario)' involved in the acquisition.
14 However, just how much time he thought had to pass before long use was established is not clear. 15 That it was established because it could be shown to extend to a time beyond the memory of anyone alive is a proposition which he seems to have entertained, 16 but he appears never to have maintained that a coronation date limiting recovery of seisin was to be used to settle whether a right had been prescriptively acquired.
A similar observation might be made with regard to judges of the very early year book period. They certainly ruled that the prescriptive acquisition of an incorporeal right depended on nobody alive being able to provide testimony contradicting long and continuous user, 17 and on the claimant's assertions of user not being reliant on testimony 'from time whereof there is no memory' (du temps dount il ny ad memorie).
18 When settling whether incorporeal rights had been prescriptively acquired, however, these judges treated time beyond memory as a factual question (whether anyone alive can provide relevant testimony) rather than as presumption (that nobody alive can testify to events before a specific date). Like Bracton, they appear to have considered statutory coronation dates relevant only to extinctive prescription. More significant, for our purposes, is the question of what was acquired through prescription. It would be wrong, Frederick Pollock and FW Maitland observed, to say that a claimant's right to recover expired because a prescription period had run its course, for the period has a fixed beginning but no fixed end, and so a claimant would be entitled to seek out testimony supporting his case for 'some new and defeasible title.'
19 But if the claimant could not find such testimony within living memory -a possibility which diminishes with the passing of time -the defendant's enjoyment of the land would remain undisturbed. If it was impossible for the claimant to bring a fresh writ of right based on new testimony, his right to recover would be at an end, and his loss would be to the defendant's gain.
But what, exactly, did the defendant gain? Bracton wavered between presuming the defendant to have acquired a right binding against the entire world 20 and presuming the right to be inchoate -to be a right which protected the defendant's enjoyment of the property but which might still be defeated by writ and judgment. 21 His preferred position, John Salmond thought, was that a right acquired through long and continuous enjoyment is to be presumed inchoate and defeasible. 22 English law came to accept the opposite position: that prescriptively acquired rights vest title in the (incorporeal) thing acquired as if legal title to that thing had been expressly granted. The point is not that Bracton made the wrong call, or that he dithered, but rather that he seemed sensitive to the difficulty of explaining what sort of right vests by prescription. The seventeenth-century writers to whom we turn in section III seemed unaware of this difficulty. Through prescription -this appears to have ), whereby a failed action for recovery was presumed to vest lawful title in the person in possession of the land.
Littleton refers to legal reasoning about testimony within memory and the statute on recovery as 'diverse opinions' 25 -things that people 'have said'
26 -about prescription. Although the two versions of prescription had evolved as discrete bodies of law -the first concerning the acquisition of incorporeal rights and the second limiting rights to recover land -he did not treat them thus. That he should not have done so is understandable since, certainly by the early 1300s (and possibly earlier), attorneys and judges were quite regularly using the limitation date established in the first Statute of Westminster analogously so as to fix the outer limit of the prescription period for the acquisition of easements and other incorporeal hereditaments. 27 When considering acquisitive prescription claims, judges gradually stopped interpreting 'time out of mind' literally, as So the year 1189, which in 1275 had been set to limit the period within which a person could seek a remedy, came to be used to affirm a right. If there was evidence of long and uninterrupted enjoyment of land dating back to 1189, then, since matters before that date were legally beyond memory and could not be proved, it would be presumed that the person asserting enjoyment (typically, an easement) was using the land pursuant to a right recognized by the holder of the freehold before 1189.
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Most seventeenth-century constitutional writers who invoked prescription treated Richard I's coronation as the date fixing the acquisitive prescription period (some referred to prescription without mentioning a date). Common lawyers, by contrast, had, by the seventeenth century, become somewhat disenchanted with 1189. Edward Coke reports a case from 1606 in which it was proved that the land right being claimed had not existed since 1189, though it had existed for over three centuries. It would be absurd, Lord Ellesmere thought, to rule that the right therefore could not be prescriptively acquired. '[A]ll shall be presumed to be done, which might make the ancient appropriation good. . . . God forbid that ancient grants and acts should be drawn in question' because continuous enjoyment over three centuries ('after the death of all the parties, and after so many successions of ages') fell short of what was 'necessary to the perfection of the thing.' 30 This was not rebellion. The court, led by Ellesmere, reached its decision 'upon consideration of precedents.' 31 The use of 1189 as an extinctive prescription date ended in 1540, when Henry VIII introduced a limitation statute requiring that testimony in support of a writ of right be brought in the sixty years before commencement of suit. 32 It would have been an obvious step for the courts thereafter to stop referring to 1189 altogether and to apply the sixty-year limitation rule in cases concerning the prescriptive acquisition of easements and other incorporeal rights as well. But -to the bewilderment of William Blackstone and others -this never happened. 33 Nevertheless, from as early as the second half of the fourteenth Ellesmere had espied one reason for the drift towards this presumption: generations of uninterrupted enjoyment of appurtenant land could be found to be insufficient to establish an easement by prescription if that enjoyment would have been impossible in 1189. But there was another reason: judges were sometimes ruling that a right had been prescriptively acquired because there was no evidence of enjoyment being interrupted since 1189, notwithstanding that the mode of enjoyment would have been impossible in the twelfth century! 35 A strict rule that incorporeal rights prescribed if nobody demonstrated interruption to their enjoyment since 1189 produced absurdities, and so the courts gradually began to favour the presumption that a right had existed since 1189, and had therefore prescribed, if uninterrupted enjoyment could be proved within living memory.
36 Seventeenth-century constitutional writers never adopted this presumption.
has been reduced to sixty years, it seems unaccountable, that the date of legal prescription or memory should still continue to be reckoned from an era so very antiquated'; also , where a customary right to play lawful games, sports, and pastimes in a particular place at all seasonable times of the year was held to justify the playing of cricket, even though cricket was unknown during the reign of Richard I and would have been unlawful for some time thereafter. 36 Prescription was codified by parliament in the 1830s. In the mid-eighteenth century, judges began to direct juries that they should presume enjoyment since 1189 if there was evidence of continuous use for at least twenty years. The first case in which this presumption was used appears to be Lewis v Price, (1761) 2 Wms Saund 172 (see especially at 175a). The courts, in introducing this presumption, were applying by analogy the period beyond which various possessory actions such as ejectment were barred under the Limitation Act 1623 (21 Jac 1, c 16). Since the presumption of enjoyment could be, and quite often was, rebutted by evidence that a right being claimed could not have existed in 1189, judges started to resort to another presumption: that evidence of
B PRESCRIPTION AND CUSTOM
In English common law, the coronation of Richard I still divides time beyond and time within legal memory. An incorporeal right cannot be prescriptively acquired (though it is almost inconceivable that anyone would nowadays hope to acquire such a right through the common law) if there is evidence countering the presumption of enjoyment stretching back to 1189. The date is also used to define immemorial custom. But immemorial custom is also sometimes characterized as prescribed custom. From their inception, the year books contain numerous instances of title being established by prescription because a local custom has existed from time immemorial. 37 Local 'custom . . . used by title of prescription,' Littleton observed, is custom 'from time out of mind.'
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If a customary right is a prescriptively acquired right, what distinguishes custom and prescription? Sir Edward Coke, commenting on Littleton, drew a distinction which was already present in the law reports. 39 He continuous user for more than twenty years raised the presumption that the prescriptively acquired right had been granted to someone since 1189 but that evidence of the grant had been lost. The courts were unclear whether this presumption was conclusive or rebuttable. In 1799, the court of common pleas held that a claimant could not challenge a grant presumed in favour of the defendant after twenty-three years' continuous user: Holcroft v Heel, (1799) 1 Bos & Pull 400. Four years later, the king's bench ruled that there were circumstances in which such a presumption could be displaced: Campbell v Wilson, (1803) 3 East 294. Two decades later still, Abbot CJ, in the same court, remarked that it is correct to instruct jurors that twenty years' uninterrupted user should (so long as 'there is nothing in the usage to contravene the public policy' or that is 'against any known rule or principle of law') be treated as 'cogent evidence' that the practice has existed since time immemorial: R v Joliffe, (1823) 2 B & C 54 at 59. Parliament resolved the uncertainty in 1832. Under s 2 of the Prescription Act 1832, evidence of twenty years' user establishes a strong presumption that, at some point earlier, a (now lost) grant of the prescriptively acquired right was made. The presumption is practically unassailable because it can only be rebutted by proof that the grant could not have been made in the time before the prescription period but after 1189. In any event, once user has run for forty years, the prescriptively acquired right becomes absolute. 37 See e.g. (1292) 40 However, 'in the common law' prescription 'is a title which is . . . for the most part applied to persons,' whereas 'a custom, which is local, is alleged in no person, but laid within some manor or other place.' 41 To determine that title has vested by prescription is to say that a particular person has acquired a right as if that right had been legally granted to him. But to determine that a local custom is legally binding because it is immemorial and has therefore prescribed is to establish law applicable to, and for the benefit of, everyone within the community where that custom operates. The distinction is significant for our purposes, because prescriptive arguments invoked by seventeenth-century constitutional writers are sometimes arguments about prescribed customs and at other times about how the king ought not to suspend or dispense with certain rights enjoyed by his subjects because his subjects had acquired those rights by prescription. It is to these arguments that we turn next.
III Prescribed fundamentals?
Modern English constitutional lawyers tend to see the seventeenth century as a time of struggle between parliament and the courts, with nobody doubting that law-making authority was eventually confirmed as resting in parliament but with scholars diverging over what the higher judiciary thought it could do if parliament were to legislate against common right and reason. The primary legal power struggle in the seventeenth century was not between parliament and the courts, however, but between parliament and the Crown. Although, after the Restoration settlement of 1660, Charles II was less dismissive of parliament than his father had been, events of the following decade -particularly the king's attempt to extend religious liberties to Catholics and his opposition to efforts to exclude his Catholic brother from succeeding to the thronereinvigorated parliament's concerns about monarchs ignoring its will and abrogating its laws. When James II, Charles's brother, did accede to the throne in 1685, many of his actions -the use of prerogative to dispense with and suspend laws without parliament's consent, the removal of freeholders' property rights without due process of law, the efforts to 40 'The king has a superior, namely God,' Bracton reputedly remarked, and '[a]lso, the law by which he was made king.' 42 In his Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (1643), the barrister and polemicist, William Prynne, seized on this remark as support for the argument that 'law and parliament' are 'above the king' (whose actions 'are and must be subject' to the courts). 43 His argument hinted at prescription. Since there were 'laws and kingdoms before [there were] kings,' parliament had acquired ultimate law-making authority ('[l]egislative power is more in the parliament than in the king, if not wholly in it') as if by long and uninterrupted enjoyment. 44 Not only was the Long Parliament within its rights to declare in March 1642, in the absence of Charles I, that its ordinances would be binding laws, Prynne insisted, but the king had not been within his rights to absent himself. 'The king is bound by all means possible to be present at the parliament' when it is summoned, because this has been the convention since '[w]hen parliaments were first begun.' 45 Prynne's commitment to this argument was short-lived. The king was not above the law, he maintained in 1648, but neither was parliament sovereign. Rather, law-making power was shared between them. Although he had adopted a new argument, his reasoning was still rooted in prescription. 'This right of theirs [parliament and the king] is confirmed by prescription and custom from the very first beginning of parliaments in this kingdom till this present.' 46 The new argument superficially resembled another one: that legislative power was entrusted to the king, lords, and commons as distinct, but coordinated, powers. This argument, which But Herle and Prynne were not of the same mind. Certainly, neither accepted royal absolutism, both asserted that parliament shared legislative power with the king, and both sought to make their assertions credible by arguing that parliament had existed since time immemorial. Yet their positions differed in one crucial respect. For Herle, sovereignty lay in the lords and commons with the king because of the antiquity of all three estates. Those who regarded the king's authority to be subordinate only to divine law considered this argument easily derailed, for the establishment of the commons as an independent estate was within living memory: the king's tenured subjects were certainly being summoned to parliament in 1100, at the beginning of Henry I's reign, one royalist writer observed, but the commons was not recognized as a representative body of the kingdom until the mid-thirteenth century. 50 Prynne was a curiosity, for he insisted on the antiquity of parliament, but -as the title of his 1648 essay made clear -he was specifically making a plea for the lords. 51 The lords had prescriptively acquired rights which entitled them to legislate in coordination with the king, he argued, but on the matter of the commons he was in agreement with those who insisted on the king's divine right: evidence of the commons' long and uninterrupted enjoyment of law-making powers equal to those of the king simply did not exist. After the Restoration, Charles II appointed Prynne as keeper of the records in the Tower of London. It was in this capacity that Prynne uncovered bundles of old writs of summons and other parliamentary records which he believed refuted the possibility of an immemorial commons.
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As early as 1660 he was claiming that his investigations 'made good to all the world, by records, precedents, judgements in parliament, law, reason, and divinity too, that the whole House of Commons, in its greatest fullness, freedom and power, never had any lawful right or authority' to make laws in coordination with the king and the lords.
53 '[I]t indisputably appears, that parliaments, or general councils, are coeval with the kingdom itself,' Blackstone would observe a century later, but it 'has been a matter of great dispute among our learned antiquarians . . . whether the commons were summoned at all; or, if summoned, at what period they began to form a distinct assembly.' 54 Blackstone was intent on staying clear of this dispute.
55 But seventeenth-century Whig historians, who wanted to establish that the commons as well as the lords shared legislative power with the king in parliament, had to contend with the charge that prescription proved that the commons could not be an equally ranked, genuinely coordinate third estate.
Their principal response to this charge was that prescription in fact established, rather than rebutted, the case for an immemorial commons. The Revolution confirmed that the commons was subordinate to neither the lords nor the king, James Tyrrell asserted, and the pity was that anyone should have presumed otherwise -for 'proof of the constant claim the commons have made before the king and lords in parliament . . . is by prescription.' 56 If it is accepted that 'time of memory in a prescription was from the time of King Richard I,' and that 'time out of mind . . . extends beyond' that date, then the uninterrupted existence of the Tyrrell had elaborated on Herle's claim that the commons had existed as an institution since time immemorial, but he had not rendered it more convincing. By the seventeenth century, we have seen, common lawyers were no longer fully committed to the idea that it must be possible to trace enjoyment back to 1189 if a right to that enjoyment was to be prescriptively acquired; proof of enjoyment within actual living memory was sometimes taken to suffice. But Tyrrell interpreted prescription strictly: for a right to prescribe, the activity or institution which formed the basis of that right had to be in continuous evidence since the coronation of Richard I. The commons had acquired the right to be recognized as a coordinate third estate, he believed, because it had existed sinceindeed, existed long before -that date.
Tyrrell was by no means a lone voice. 'Our government by a king and estates of parliament,' Thomas Hunt asserted, 'is as ancient as anything Whig historians appeared to have invoked prescription to make a case not for recognizing particular rights as fundamental but rather for accepting the legislative authority of the commons within parliament as an integral feature of the unwritten constitution. The case was easy to dismiss if it depended entirely on the assertion that the commons as an institution must have existed adamantine since 1189. But the Whigs had another string to their bow. The commons might not have emerged as a representative body of the kingdom until the mid-thirteenth century, but freemen had long been represented at parliamentary -and, before the time of parliament, conciliar -assemblies. Leaving aside the question of the provenance and status of the commons as an estate, was there not a prescribed right to representation? Prynne thought not, but he summarized the argument neatly: On what was Lambarde's thinking based? He was convinced, as was Coke, that the 'prescribed' custom of the better-appointed Anglo-Saxon boroughs ('of ancient demesne') was to choose not to send burgesses to council, and that from this it was reasonable to infer that council would have been willing to admit representatives from less privileged boroughs ('other places'), and that these boroughs would have opted to send representatives (would have adopted 'a contrary usage of the self-same thing').
68 But Lambarde was careful not to present the inference as proof that the 'commonality of the realm' had a prescriptively acquired right to representation in parliament.
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Various seventeenth-century parliamentarians were more forthright. Dugdale asserted, 'include[d] the representatives of the people, or commons,' with some English counties and boroughs 'having ever since prescribed to be privileged from sending burgesses to parliament' while 'other places did send burgesses'; 'it must . . . follow,' accordingly, 'that there were parliaments before' the Conquest. 70 Roger Twysden wrote similarly of how 'it cannot be concluded' that, 'because sometimes the lords are only remembered to have met,' the 'commons were not parties to what passed in th[e] great [Anglo-Saxon] assemblies.' For if it is accepted that 'no custom can begin since 1 R 1,' it follows that 'the sending [of] . . . burgesses to parliament,' which began 'before that king's time,' must be a 'common custom of the realm.' 71 Tyrrell, agreeing with Lambarde ('the right to sit in parliament' enjoyed by the commonality had existed 'time out of mind, that is, by prescription' 72 ), sought to make Lambarde's argument more convincing by drawing attention to legislation from Richard II's reign, which, according to Tyrrell, established that an immemorial right to parliamentary representation by 'singular persons and commonalities' was accepted by parliament in the 1380s. 73 The legislation in fact established something else: that some individuals had been summoned, and some communities summoned to send representatives, to parliament since 'old times' (dauncienete), and that there were likely to be financial penalties imposed on those who were summoned but did not comply. 74 The historians who followed in Lambarde's wake were nevertheless trying to provide evidence, rather than simply arguing that it was reasonable to infer, that burgesses had been returned to council since time immemorial. Their main discovery from the earliest chancery rolls was that the borough of St Albans had been sending burgesses to great council meetings as early as 1199 -surely enough, some thought, to make the 77 One English republican wrote in the early 1680s of how he had been 'inclined to believe that . . . our . . . commonality had not formally assembled in parliament' until the late-thirteenth century but that, after reading 'the learned discourses lately published by Mr Petit [sic],' he was 'fully convinced that it was otherwise.' 78 Royalist and high Tory writers, by contrast, were completely unmoved. That a king tolerated parliament's petitions did not equate to a right to parliamentary representation. 79 Even if it were correct to speak of a right to representation, furthermore, prescriptive acquisition of that right depended on evidence of uninterrupted enjoyment for a very long period of time. Tenants-in-chief, holding land directly from the king, could be summoned to parliament in the early thirteenth century, Henry Spelman had concluded in his Archaeologus (1626), but burgesses were not tenured at that time -this much was evident, he thought, from the wording of clause 14 of the first Magna Carta ('we will cause to be summoned . . . earls and greater barons . . .'). 80 The right of burgesses to sit in parliament must, accordingly, have been established after 1189. For the royalist, Robert Brady, there was no compelling evidence of commons representation before 1265 (49 Hen 3), and it was obvious that even after this date there were times when the king omitted to summon knights and burgesses to parliament. 81 William Prynne and Thomas Hobbes were of essentially the same view. 82 Petyt produced a long, unpublished response to Brady in which he purported to show that 'the authorities prove by a joint prescription' not only the 'several liberties' of the lords but also 'the ancient right of . . . sending . . . knights, citizens and burgesses' to be 'representatives of the commons.' 83 But he was simply advancing more laboriously a case which he and others had made already.
84 A prescribed right is one which has been acquired notwithstanding a lack of documentary legal evidence that the right was ever created. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Petyt and other Whig historians were arguing from prescription because they simply had no hard evidence supporting their case for a right of the commonality to representation. In 1681, there appeared an essay by Petyt's disciple, William Atwood, which made much the same argument, using essentially the same material, as is to be found in Petyt's Antient Right of the Commons of England Asserted. But in the closing pages of his essay, Atwood distinguishes himself by stepping back momentarily from the detail and acknowledging that the case for the immemorial sovereignty of parliament could never be properly established. While 'no sober man will deny' that in the eleventh century William I accepted that the lords had 'a right of prescription to come to the upper house,' it seems 'strange,' Atwood thought, that the 'royal concession' should have been extended to the nobility but not to the laity. 85 After all, 'proprietors of land' -holding land either from barons or directly from the king -were naturally 'interested in' and wanted to 'have a share in the legislature,' and so 'if they . . . had no right to come in person, or be represented in parliament, ' While Atwood knew which supposition he preferred, he could not be sure that his preferred supposition was the correct one. Lambarde's diffidence, it seemed, had always been waiting in the wings.
Atwood's concession might have amounted to little, but at least it showed him to be reflective. The Whig tracts were mantra-like in asserting the commons' antiquity, predictable in their recounting of the history of St Albans, eager to present Lambarde as inspirational prophet rather than cautious antiquarian. To what end all this industry nobody cared to point out. What Petyt conspicuously failed to do -what all his like-minded contemporaries failed to do -was explain why demonstrating parliamentary representation to be a prescriptively acquired right should have mattered. Possibly the Whig writers considered it to go without saying that long and uninterrupted enjoyment is a mark of quality in that which is enjoyed, that evidence of the value of a right might therefore be drawn from the fact that it has existed undisturbed (and without falling into disuse) for a very long time, and that any king who has sought to rule with the assent of the people would consider himself bound, or certainly absent good reason would consider himself bound, not to restrict or remove any such right. If this way of thinking explained the Whigs' attachment to prescription, they were essentially at one with various eminent common lawyers who had lauded immemorial custom as tested reason. 88 But it is not obvious that the Whigs' case for prescribed representation actually was attributable to this way of thinking. The significance of the right to representation having been prescriptively acquired -leaving aside the matter of whether it really had been so acquired -was taken to be self-evident. It is difficult to imagine any of the Whig writers rejecting the proposition that a prescribed right ought not to be disturbed because the reasons for accepting that right have stood the test of time. But for none of them was this proposition a pillar of their argument for a prescribed right to representation.
C PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES
In the seventeenth century, those who connected parliament and prescription were not always arguing that parliament itself, or that a right to representation in parliament, had existed since time immemorial. Sometimes, they were concerned with what parliament was entitled to do. Members of the Jacobean commons turned to prescription to make a case regarding their institutional rights. The commons' 'apology' to James I in 1604 for his having been given 'misinformation' 89 regarding the nature of parliamentary privileges was really a complaint that this foreign king was ignorant of the fact that 'the very fundamental rights of our House' 90 were not granted by the Crown but rather 'our right and due inheritance,' 91 having been 'enjoyed' by 'the whole commons . . . The commons could only have acquired its privileges prescriptively if it had existed since time immemorial, and so this argument would have been inconsequential to anyone who considered it anachronistic to speak of the commons having existed before 1189. But anyone who did believe in an immemorial commons could put the argument to good use. Charles II had been wrong to oppose the Exclusion Bill, Daniel Defoe claimed in 1689, because the commons' right to pass laws governing succession to the throne was one of its prescriptively acquired privileges. 95 Writing around the same time, Robert Atkyns, once a member the Cavalier parliament and a vigorous opponent of the Stuart monarchy, invoked prescription to advance a yet more provocative argument. Like others, he presumed the commons to be 'as ancient as the nation itself,' able 'by law' and 'title' to 'prescribe and claim a share in all parliamentary powers and privileges' in conjunction with the lords. 96 But he went further. If it is accepted as 'plain' that 'every legal prerogative must be so by prescription,'
97 not only were the commons' privileges not modernnot granted 'within time of memory . . . in a legal understanding' -but, just as significantly, the royal power to dispense with laws was modern: the origin of the prerogative was traceable to the mid-thirteenth century. 98 of the king, for that must ever be by prescription.' 99 For Atkyns, parliament could assert certain rights as prescriptively acquired privileges but, on the basis that the dispensing power had not been prescriptively acquired, it could also assert a right (one which the king's bench had pointedly refused to recognize in 1686 100 ) to see its legislation enforcing religious conformity prevail against the will of James II.
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It would be easy, and not entirely wide of the mark, to characterize the prescription-based arguments concerning parliament, representation, and privileges as illustrative of the well-known thesis that with the seventeenth century came the doctrine, or myth, that the English constitution is, as with all common law, to be understood as immemorial custom.
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Some of the writers who turned to prescription -Tyrrell, Dugdale, Atwood, and Petyt (as well as the outlier, Prynne) -figure prominently among the cast regularly cited in support of this thesis. These writers, when they attributed parliament's status or particular parliamentary rights to prescription, were sometimes using that word to describe the immemorial (prescriptive) nature of custom: this custom of the realm is custom by prescription, they would be saying, by which they meant that it was custom since time before memory and, therefore, a feature of the ancient constitution.
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But this is not the only way in which the concept of prescription was being used. Seventeenth-century constitutional writers were not wholly insensitive to the distinction -attributed to Coke in section II(B) -between custom, which is of the community, and prescription, which goes to the person. The idea of the common law being founded on immemorial custom, it was recognized, might be distinguished from the idea that individuals and entities can acquire title to something -as if that thing had been expressly granted to them -by virtue of long and uninterrupted enjoyment. Constitutional writers never made this distinction explicitly, and sometimes their arguments ran against the drawing of it -sending burgesses to parliament, for example, was considered equally to be a prescribed customary convention and an entitlement granted by ancient kings and acquired by the people through prescription. Nevertheless, In the seventeenth century, as in other periods, Magna Carta was sometimes described as having confirmed ancient liberties rather than having granted any new ones. 104 The first Magna Carta was issued in 1215, within legal memory. But if it declared existing rather than introduced new laws, if the laws which it declared were created before 1189, and if the rights protected by those laws were not only declared in Magna Carta but had also been regularly confirmed since 1215, had the king's subjects acquired those rights by prescription? For Coke, writing around 1611, Magna Carta was certainly to be understood as a declaration of immemorial, repeatedly reaffirmed legal rights: Charles II did the following year) because they had been granted by statute, affirmed by Magna Carta, and prescriptively acquired. 106 But this is a matter on which one can easily end up out on a limb. While it seems 'likely' that some seventeenth-century statesmen were thinking about the content of Magna Carta 'in terms of prescription,' Corinne Weston has observed, there is no solid evidence that anyone actually did.
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Those of this period who had an eye for detail might even have read the penultimate clause of the 12 October 1297 charter confirmation (25 Edward I) -'the . . . charter be firmly and inviolably observed in all and each of its articles, even if some of the articles contained in the . . . charter have perhaps not been hitherto observed' -as having made prescription irrelevant to the status of charter rights. In 1628, the spokesman for the commons, John Glanville, in a speech to both houses before the passage of the Petition of Right, came perhaps as close as did any seventeenth-century figure to reading Magna Carta as a set of prescriptively-acquired rights when he insisted that 'Magna Carta,' by 'declar[ing] and confirm[ing] the ancient common laws of the liberties of England,' vested 'an inherent right and interest of liberty and freedom in the subjects of this realm as their birthright and inheritance, descendable to their heirs and posterity,' and that therefore 'there is no trust in the king's sovereign power or prerogative royal to enable him to dispense with th[ose laws].' 108 If anyone in the seventeenth century was thinking of Magna Carta as a collection of prescribed rights, they were probably wise to keep it to themselves. The doctrine of prescription demands that the long and uninterrupted enjoyment which is necessary to acquisition be strictly construed. If I can show that I and my predecessors in title have regularly (and without force, stealth, and permission) used a path over my neighbour's land for the relevant prescription period, I acquire by prescription the right to use that path -and that right alone. If the laws made by an eleventh-century king protected the subject's rights in a particular way, then a claim that those rights had descended to, and so had been prescriptively acquired by, citizens in the seventeenth century depended on the protection of those laws not only having continued for many centuries but also having continued without alteration to their content. Anyone intent on making Magna Carta the basis for such a claim would have been attempting a very difficult manoeuvre. While such a manoeuvre would have been difficult, it was not necessarily impossible. Glanville, when he spoke as he did in 1628, presumably had in mind not Magna Carta as a whole but rather its clauses setting out general rights and procedures. In the early 1600s, some of the more general rights enumerated in Magna Carta -such as that freemen were entitled not to be arrested and imprisoned without due process of law (clause 39) and not to see access to justice sold, denied, or delayed (clause 40) -perhaps could have been described as ancient rights affirmed in 1215 and reaffirmed regularly ever since. Some early seventeenth-century common lawyers, as was discussed in section II(A), were presuming that rights which could be acquired by prescription had existed since 1189, and therefore had prescribed, if they could be shown to have persisted without disturbance throughout actual living memory. Had Glanville or any other parliamentarian of this period adopted the same presumptionthere is no evidence that any of them did -they might have been able to make a convincing case (should they have wanted to make the case) for treating particular clauses of Magna Carta as expressions of prescribed rights. Without this presumption, however, even a prescriptive reading of Magna Carta limited to its more general clauses was a tricky proposition, because the rights set forth in those clauses would be incapable of prescribing if there was evidence that they could not have prevailed without interruption since the coronation of Richard I.
Certainly it would not have been difficult, in the seventeenth century, to make the case that the rights affirmed in some of Magna Carta's more general clauses could not have existed continuously since 1189. Consider, for example, clause 12, which stipulates that a monarch cannot levy feudal aid from his subjects 'save by the common counsel of our kingdom.' Such a stipulation would not have seemed bizarre in 1189, 109 and the principle that consent is a prerequisite to taxation was certainly reaffirmed by parliament at various junctures from the late thirteenth century onwards -including, eventually, in both the Petition of Right and the Declaration of Rights.
110 Yet reaffirmations did not deter various monarchs from imposing taxes without parliamentary approval (as Charles I did in the years before the Petition of Right and in the decade when he ruled without parliament). 111 It would have required a considerable stretch of the imagination to conclude, in the seventeenth century, that the people had within living memory, let alone since 1189, continuously enjoyed the right not to be taxed by the king without parliament's consent.
It would have been downright foolish to conclude that, by the seventeenth century, Magna Carta in its entirety had prescribed. Much of Magna Carta -clauses concerning the removal of alien knights and cross-bowmen from the realm, the returning of Welsh hostages, the delaying of decisions on deforestation until the king's return from a crusade, and so on -had fallen into desuetude by 1600. The content of the charter, furthermore, had hardly remained unaltered. It was revised within a year of its first issue -the 1216 Magna Carta omits three of the original clauses, including the provision determining how it was to be enforced (clause 61) -and its text underwent numerous other emendations before the definitive version was issued in February 1225. As John Selden remarked in 1610, to presume legal constancy between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries was -irrespective of whether Magna Carta was a bridge between the present and an immemorial paststraightforwardly to ignore reality: while some laws had 'been carefully enough kept up from the time of the Saxons, and perhaps from an earlier date,' the 'times on this side the Norman's entrance are so full of new laws' that 'to refer the original of our English laws to th[e] Conquest' can only be 'a huge mistake. 1307) onwards were evidence of the continuity of the Confessor's laws, there was no reason to think that the rights which were eventually enacted in 1689 were essentially the same as those which were legally recognized in the eleventh century.
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Perhaps what is most perplexing about the idea that one might interpret Magna Carta prescriptively (as well as the idea that the right to parliamentary representation was prescriptively acquired) is the presumption that the king's subjects could claim a right as fundamental because they could show that they enjoyed that right by prescription. If a king believed that he ruled by divine sanction and that he was accountable only to God, why should he have cared that a right had existed since the time of Edward the Confessor? What was to stop a modern king nullifying rights granted by an ancient one? Before concluding with a general assessment of the arguments connecting fundamental rights with prescription, let us consider what appears to be the one instance in which the seventeenthcentury literature challenging royal absolutism yields a distinct -which is not to say compelling -answer to this question.
E PRESCRIBED RESIDUAL RIGHTS
A few years after the Revolution, George Savile, the Marquess of Halifax, wrote of how the sovereignty of parliament made it difficult to speak convincingly of English fundamental rights: 'no feather has been more blown about in the world than this word Fundamental. . . . There is no fundamental, for the parliament may judge as they please,' even if 'their act is ill.' 115 The difficulty with treating Magna Carta as a collection of constitutional fundamentals, he thought, was that it 'is very hard to be proved' that it 'was for the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England' as opposed to simply a grant of liberties by a medieval king. 116 If Magna Carta was indeed a collection of liberties granted by a king (or, as Halifax preferred, by a parliament), then it cannot set forth fundamental rights, for 'a subsequent parliament' must have 'the right of repealing' it just as that 'preceding parliament' had 'the right of making it.' 117 Halifax appreciated that this reasoning cannot entirely undermine the notion of fundamental rights, because just such a right appears to be enjoyed by the sovereign legislator. Yet although 'the king's prerogative' is 114 absolute -a 'power which neither will nor ought to be bounded' 118 -the 'wise' monarch recognizes '[t]hat prerogative is a trust' and that laws 'are not the king's laws, nor the parliament's laws, but the laws of England, in which, after they have passed by the legislative power, the people have the property.'
119 Robert Atkyns set forth a similar argument in his essay of 1689, attacking the use of the dispensing power, although his point seemed to be that enacted laws are the property of those who make them -the king, lords, and commons -rather than the people.
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That this general notion of laws as property was very much in the air in the late seventeenth century is also evident from a letter written from exile in 1687 by the Scottish cleric, Gilbert Burnet. It is 'a matter of great encouragement,' Burnet observed sarcastically, that 'the perfect enjoyment of the[ people's] property has never been . . . invaded by [James II] since his coming to the Crown.' 121 In the king's short reign, there had been many such invasions -the levying of 'customs and . . . additional excise' without parliament's approval, the Bloody Assizes ('an open act of hostility to all law') following the Monmouth Rebellion, the 'many murders' and other illegal interferences with 'the right that a man has to his life' -and so there was at least reassurance in learning that 'all these things have fallen out without [the king's] privity.'
122 Although Halifax had disparaged fundamental rights, the proposition that the king was not alone in being able to claim legislation as his property seemed to lend credence to the concept: since the people (or, certainly, their representatives) had dominion over enacted laws along with the king, they had a right to see those laws -their jointly owned property -introduced, respected, amended, and repealed in accordance with their wishes.
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Others besides the king, according to this argument, had property in enacted laws. But could one also assert proprietorship over a legal right because it had been acquired by prescription rather than expressly granted? Certainly one Whig propagandist answered in the negative. 124 Yet not everybody considered the idea preposterous. A prescriptively acquired easement is not a right conferred but rather a right borne of passivity -it comes into being because land has been enjoyed in a particular way over a period of time without anyone who was entitled to object to that enjoyment having done so. One anonymous pamphleteer, writing at the time of the settlement in 1689, remarked on how some fundamental rights might be understood in much the same way: not as rights expressly granted but rather as rights which have been enjoyed for a long time and -until recently -left undisturbed by those with legislative power. A fundamental right is typically an The implications of his argument for the law-making sovereignty of parliament, however, are less obvious. '[R]esistance' to the sovereignty of 'the lawgivers . . . can never be lawful,' he asserted, unless they happen to commit a 'notorious violation' of 'the fundamental laws of the kingdom.'
129 What sort of violation would be so notorious as to warrant resistance? What form would the resistance take? John Locke, writing around the same time, insisted (and was not alone in insisting) that the people had extrajudicial authority to seek dissolution of the government if the sovereign legislator abused its powers. 130 It is possible that this pamphleteer was claiming the same, though we cannot be certain that he was. This final instance connecting prescription and fundamental rights yields an argument every bit as enigmatic as Coke's famous dictum that the common law would control acts of parliament and adjudge them void when they are 'against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed.' . . yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power . . . there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, which they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them'; and ibid at II, xix, 221: 'There is, therefore, . . . another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, . 133 but by the early 1700s, constitutional arguments invoking prescription had basically had their day. Not that it had been much of a day. In Stuart constitutional discourse, the word 'prescription' was, we have seen, sometimes used for no purpose other than to describe an immemorial custom. Prescription sui generis certainly featured in some arguments for restricting royal power, but none of those who relied on the concept seemed able, or at least none bothered, to say why the enjoyment and regular re-affirmation of a right since time before memory should make that right immune to the prerogative.
Common lawyers have always appreciated that prescription is a fairly inflexible doctrine. Enjoyment has to be long and continuous. A definite amount of time has to pass before a right can prescribe, and only certain types of rights can prescribe with the passing of that time. Restrictive covenants, for example, must be expressly conferred and can never be prescriptively acquired. Negative easements are a restricted category, not to be extended even by analogy. 134 While English law allows for the prescriptive acquisition of rights to enjoy land, the informal acquisition of legal estates in land is governed by the (extinctive) doctrine of adverse possession. Anyone claiming to have acquired a right over land by prescription, one Victorian barrister took considerable care to explain, must satisfy a formidable number of conditions. 135 The seventeenth-century political writers who appealed to prescription paid little attention to the subtlety of the doctrine and left unresolved various questions concerning its application to constitutional matters. Could a doctrine concerning the rights and duties of private landholders -concerning how owners of this land, but no other land, can be said to have acquired a right over a neighbour's land -be straightforwardly recast as an argument for protecting the rights of a class of people against the intrusions of the state (or Crown)? If prescription went to individuals and customs to communities, as Coke had maintained, how could arguments concerning the general rights of people vis-à-vis the Crown, and concerning the right of parliament to deal with the succession to the throne, genuinely be based on prescription? Before 1689, the argument from prescription was, in essence, that the king's rights should give way to the rights of the subject, as enacted (or reaffirmed) by parliament. How, if at all, would this argument apply to parliament itself once it had the power to make and change laws? ''Tis most reasonable . . . now,' one convert to the Revolution claimed in 1709, 'that . . . the most rightful government which is established' is the one with 'the best title . . . which has prevailed by prescription.' 136 But what if this government sought to interfere with prescribed liberties and privileges? Would it be constrained by the doctrine which had supposedly enabled it to prevail? Burke would argue that it was so constrained. 137 Seventeenth-century Whig writers appeared to think otherwise. 138 right but also what kind of right they had acquired. Seventeenth-century constitutional writers, unburdened by the obligation of ruling on legal disputes, appear never to have given serious thought to the question of what sorts of rights prescription might generate. Their general point was that prescription makes a constitutional right fundamental in the sense outlined in the opening paragraph of this article -that the fact of a right having prescribed should make a legislator extremely reluctant to disturb it.
The point was distinctively about prescribed public law rights -rights which somebody or some entity (usually the commons) was seeking to secure against the sovereign. None of these writers was arguing that an easement, or any other private law right, was to be categorized as fundamental by virtue of prescription. But this was puzzling. Did they believe that prescriptively acquired private law rights were fundamental rights? How could prescription be the key to understanding the fundamentality of a constitutional right if the rights which actually did prescribe in law -various incorporeal rights over land -were not considered to be fundamental? Various seventeenth-century parliamentarians were at once convinced that public law rights might be deemed fundamental by virtue of prescription and also silent on the matter of whether the same could be said of private law rights. If prescriptively-acquired private law rights were not to be classified as fundamental rights -it is not obvious that any seventeenth-century constitutional writer believed that they were to be classified thus -the key to explaining constitutional rights as fundamental rights would appear to lie somewhere other than in the doctrine of prescription.
The doctrine is, in fact, poorly suited to explaining fundamental rights under an unwritten constitution. Some of the great seventeenth-century English lawyers liked to compare the common law to the ship long at sea: just as the ship remains the same entity even though (through repair and refurbishments) its material changes over time, the common law remains rooted in the same ancient general customs even though it adapts to new circumstances and accommodates new content. 139 Unlike the common law, prescription bears no comparison to this ship, for the use or enjoyment cited in support of a claim that a right has been prescriptively acquired must, if the claim is to succeed, remain unchanged throughout the prescription period; when there is evidence that the use or enjoyment cited to establish the right has not stayed the same or is of recent origin, the case for prescriptive acquisition founders. Prescription is ill suited to explaining fundamental rights because the content and range of fundamental rights need not stay the same -they can be altered and supplemented by legislation and through the development of the common law -and such rights will sometimes have originated within the prescription period. The right to avoid self-incrimination, for example, first appears in English ecclesiastical law in the sixteenth century, does not enter the common law until the early seventeenth century, 140 and only in the twentieth century is elaborated so that an arrested person acquires an additional right to be told of the right. 141 The doctrine of prescription cannot satisfactorily explain unwritten constitutional rights as fundamental rights because it requires that all of these rights be static and very old.
Nevertheless, some Stuart constitutionalists considered the doctrine to serve their objectives with distinction. 'An argument from prescription,' Petyt proclaimed, is 'the most unanswerable and binding argument that possibly can be produced.'
142 Prescription established constitutional titlea word used repeatedly by seventeenth-century parliamentarians -though it is indisputable that sometimes they meant nothing other than that an institution (such as the commons) or a convention (such as sending burgesses to parliament) was part of immemorial custom.
When these writers argued that prescription established constitutional title in some more distinctive sense -when prescription was being invoked to explain not the community's prescribed customs but rather people's fundamental rights -what reasoning or philosophy, if any, lay behind the argument? We can only guess. The reasoning sometimes appeared to be that a prescribed right was fundamental because it was first in time: a right which has existed since time before memory may well have existed before there were kings, and a monarch should not interfere with a right which might be presumed to pre-date him and his kind. This seems to be Prynne's reasoning, set out at the beginning of section III(A), and it perhaps also explains that anonymous pamphleteer's (sardonic?) proposition that the prerogative cannot defeat prescriptively As an illustration of this last observation, and by way of conclusion, consider John Locke -a name which one might have expected (which I had certainly expected) to feature more prominently in this article. In the 1680s, Locke, a hero to the Whigs, developed a theory of title acquisition that posed the question to which prescription supplies an answer: when did this property 'begin to be [the title-holder's],' given that he acquired it 'without the assignation or consent of anybody'?
156 Although Locke's own response to the question made no reference to long and uninterrupted enjoyment, it is not inconceivable that some of the Whig writers who invoked the notion of entitlement by prescription were thinking broadly as did Locke when he wrote of 'how labour could . . . begin a title of property in the common things of nature' 157 -that their argument was that people (by virtue of long enjoyment rather than labour) have property in, and so are entitled not to see disturbed, legal arrangements which protect rights that they hold dear. A philosophical denouement would, however, be a fabrication. For there is no evidence that any of these writers were thinking along Lockean lines (or along any other distinct philosophical lines) when they argued from prescription. Tyrrell, who on at least one occasion refers to title by prescription in relation to matters constitutional, 158 was a friend (of sorts) to Locke, 159 and it would not have been surprising to discover in his main works, which appeared after the publication of Locke's Two Treatises of Government, at least references to the labour theory of acquisition. Yet neither he nor any other late seventeenth-century Whig introduced Locke's name when invoking prescription -a noteworthy absence, given that these men never seemed shy about drawing attention to sources supporting their causes. 160 Prescription was certainly a concept of some significance in seventeenth-century constitutional thought. Why this should have been so is something of a mystery.
